ZOMBIE FORUMS

So the problem is that we do not know how to duplicate the process of evolution of consciousness from the chemical level of a protozoan to the neural level of a vertabrate? Well, it took a few hundred million years to do it in nature.

Well I"m of the opinion that even when we are able to achieve what nature did with it's slimey tools with our silicone friends, that their 'sentience' isn't going to resemble ours too closely.

It'd be like trying to hold a conversation with a sentient Bee hive that learned English. There's just alot of shit that we, as humans, wouldn't 'get' about being a Bee. Or Hive for that matter.

The single biggest difference is that all CS systems are predictable. Even, down to which op-code is running at any given moment. I can track a run, on the debugger, save it, run it again, and the new track will be identicle to the previous track. Even which memory cell is being used, at any given nanosecond, is predictable. This is a fully deterministic system. Such determinism does not exist in nature and biological organisms statistically vary more than that. This is also a reason that current digital systems can never perform like our analog organic systems can. Yes, there are specific differences with the meanings of digital and analog as well.

So if all computer systems are predictable, what would be a non-determinate algorithm? Something with a rand() function thrown in there somewhere? Would the rand() have to draw from a true random number generator (like something using radioactive decay) or would a function that just does some fancy transformations on the current timestamp to get a pseudo-random number work just as well?

Also, aren't these computer systems only "predictable" inasmuch as we built and designed them and thus know all the functions that are applied to the inputs, and we put the data into them to begin with, thus allowing us to predict the outputs? That doesn't sound too different from the philosophical definition of determinism, except that we don't happen to know all the functions (the laws of nature) perfectly, nor have we the ability to detect all the inputs on a system (since everything in the universe affects everything else), so we don't know the precise formulas to calculate, nor the values of all the variables in them, in order to be able to make our predictions. The thesis of determinism just says that IF we knew all the functions (the laws of nature) and all the inputs (the current state of the whole universe), we would be able to predict the output, i.e. nothing is truly random, just beyond our understanding.

Easy: until you start talking either true random numbers (yes, derived from radioactive decay or Brownian motion or somesuch) or quantum computing, there is no such thing as a non-determinate algorithm. Computations in computers are *always* deterministic; the same inputs will always give you the same outputs. The timestamp-pRand() function you described is just a way to ensure that you never have the same inputs over a reasonable set of normal trials, though it's still not a true random number and really isn't all that good for a randomized function that truly requires real random input.

And you would be wrong about that; scientists have known that for near a hundred years now. Most of quantum mechanics is non-deterministic; Brownian motion is just a macroscopic example. This is why, for instance, single photons can interfere with themselves, producing a diffraction pattern when going through a grating.

Note that I am not making the mistake of saying that quantum mechanics implies the existence of a conscious mind--that has also been fairly well debunked--but that the processes of thought in the brain are themselves non-deterministic, non-mathematical quantum mechanical processes, and thus cannot be fully determined even by the most advanced computers. The idea of a computer ever being able to fully calculate the whole of the human mind, based solely on complete knowledge of the inputs, which the Uncertainty Principle expressly forbids, by the way, is impossible, which is why we are forced to come up with macroscopic models based on the brain's structure rather than computationally reading its thoughts.

That works for my ex as well. Also, if my ex had an ex girlfriend I'd be hitting on her as well. HTH.

I was asking Slamlander that question because he said that he wasn't talking about determinism "in the general sense", but "in the terms of deterministic algorithms and systems in Computer Science", implying that the latter was something other than just any old algorithm that didn't rely on non-determinism in the general sense (e.g. radioactive decay).



I'm not claiming that determinism is true, merely restating the definition of it again, for the sake of trying to find out how determinism "in the terms of deterministic algorithms and systems in Computer Science" is different from regular old run-of-the-mill determinism.



Ok, so let set aside the whole issue of predictability, since (as you said, and as I earlier said) we can't know all the inputs and we don't, even if we could, know the functions (laws of nature) perfectly. The question at hand is about whether you could have functionality which we would describe as a human-like mind implemented in a "deterministic" system; one which is non-chaotic and thus does not show signs of randomness at the larger scale, e.g. a computer. (Even though, as the universe is non-deterministic, even a computer is not strictly deterministic but merely non-chaotic; randomness is extremely unlikely to be observed at any relevant scale, since the randomness present at the quantum scale has little effect on the operations on much larger scales; though if we built our computers differently it could, e.g. quantum tunneling problems with submicron etchings in chips).

So, I'm willing to grant (though not being a neuroscientist I don't know for a fact) that the human brain is quite likely a chaotic system, and nondeterminism on the quantum scale is likely to manifest on larger scales significantly more often than it would in a computer system. So, predictability aside, if you were to take a person sitting alone in a cell with no outside input, and then magically rewind time and let that person live through exactly the same week over and over and over again (his mind of course being "rewound" as well), his mind would probably be in an at-least-slightly different state at the end of each run through that week; while a computer sitting in a closet doing some very difficult calculations all week long would probably have the exact same state at the end of every run, barring some extremely unlikely quantum fluctuations.

The question now is, is that chaos and manifest randomness on a large scale a necessary feature of a human-like mind? My answer would be no; though if you've got arguments otherwise I'd like to hear them. But imagine, for illustration of my position, that you have a computer system built such that the aforementioned quantum tunneling problems occur, or somehow or another, true random error is introduced into the functioning of the computer. However, the computer is programmed to compensate for such errors, so they don't just crash the system, they just introduce more errors into the calculations and make the computer have to reprocess things and take circuitous roundabout measures of ensuring that it's probably got the right output. You can probably imagine a system like this being produced via a genetic algorithm of some sort, where we humans determine which programs produce the "right output" most often despite the error-prone nature of the system, and thus which programs get reproduced; but one way or another, the final program we select will be code like any other, just code that can tolerate error and randomness. Such code could theoretically have been written and designed instead of selected through an evolutionary process; heck, it might have even been more efficient to do so.

But now imagine you take that final code and implement it on hardware which is not so error-prone. That code running on the error-prone hardware would, like a human brain, end up giving different outputs at the end of one week of executing. That same code, running on hardware which is not error prone, would give the exact same output at the end of one week of executing. But it's still the same code! Imagine now that that code, on the error-prone hardware full of true randomness, managed to simulate human intelligence. Would you say that the same code, running on error-free hardware, would no longer seem intelligent to us?

I guess the point I'm making is that while, yes, the human brain is probably a chaotic system which manifests randomness on the macro-scale, what makes it distinct from just a box of true random number generators sitting in someone's skull is the non-random functionality of it; the patterns, functions, and predictable behavior of it. So it seems that if you could perfectly replicate all those "deterministic" features of a human brain and leave out the randomness, it would still be what we'd call intelligent. The randomness is not a necessary feature, it's just incidental.

Ladies and gentlemen, the next Pocket Dimension Open thread.

I've worked through the argument that forrest has given, and I can't agree with it.

I guess this is what makes me an engineer. I agree that the brain is a machine; how it works, I have no idea. However, to get to how it works, I'd like to see the workings. I like to take things apart, to look at the cogs and wheels, and work out what's going on. That's my problem with this whole thread: there is no one here who's even remotely into neurology. Any brain doctors here? Anyone who's even studied the mophology of the brain? To be of some use, I'd like to see essays towards tools which at least model, attempt to determine what's going on n the mind. Any fixed positions at this stage of the science are only bluster. The philosophy will come *after the pragmatists have built a working explanation.

I agree that arguing about how in particular the human brain functions is silly for us yokels on a message board to do. However, unless you adhere to strict mind-brain identity (i.e. the human mind just is a mass of neurons, and understanding the mind is nothing more than understanding neurology; rather than the functionalist stance that the mind is defined by what those neurons do, and if something else did those same things, it would also be a mind), then IMO it's still perfectly fine for us to sit and philosophize about what sort of functions are necessary and sufficient for something to count as sentient, intelligent, conscious, etc.

It's just a problem of saying "imagine you had some system which functioned in such-and-such a way, inside of someone's skull operating their body. Apart from looking in their skull, is there any way you could tell that it wasn't a human brain in there?" Basically the Turing Test - if you can't tell it apart from a mind, then it is a mind. The question is then, simply, what functions need to be there to convince us that it's a mind?

My short list off the top of my head is that is must have object recognition, e.g. seeing tables, chairs, rocks and trees instead of just patterns of light; it must be able to understand language, mapping objects and relations to abstract symbols, and perform logical deduction with those symbols; it must have memory, and be able to extrapolate patterns from its memories; it must be conscious, that is, self-aware, able to monitor it's own thought processes; and it must have volitional analogs of all of these as well. I'm not claiming that this list is definitive - as I said, it's just off the top of my head - but this is the kind of thing that's left to argue about. Even if we had a complete neuroscience and knew exactly what functions the human brain performed, we could still ask which of those are necessary and sufficient for it to instantiate a mind. An alien may have a very different sort of brain from ours, with very different functions, and yet we could still imaginably call them sentient/intelligent/conscious; so what functions are necessary to warrant such appellations? That's where the philosophy comes in.

Yep, but as you say, determinig the epistemology of the mind is essentially a philosophical task.



See, understanding how the neurons of the brain work will not tell you more than the mechanical basis of the mind that runs on the neurons of the brain. There can be no way that empirical knowledge of the functioning of the mechanical basis of the brain can determine the value of any particular set of neuron-functions. Any 'mind-brain identity' stance is therefore fallacious.

ri[[3r, understanding how a rifle works (empirical knowledge), for example, does not give any inkling as to whether a sniper rifle or a machine gun is better (value judgement).

The brain is a machine, but what controls the brain? Even a highly advanced computer needs human input.

This is where the soul comes into play, but since the soul defies evidence there's really no reason for me to say anything more.

For the record, I'm not saying anything about value judgements. I'm talking about the question of "what counts as a mind?" Sniper rifles and machine guns are both "rifles", despite their differences - what is it that makes them both rifles then? (Answer: the rifling on the barrel plus whatever set of features are necessary to count as a firearm of any sort). Likewise, a human brain, an alien brain, and an AI could all conceivably be "intelligent" or whatever superlative adjective you want to use - what is it that makes them all that, then? What set of features is necessary? (And backing up the subject a bit, is randomness or unpredictability such a necessary feature?).

Although I personally do believe in the existence of the soul, it's not logically necessary for intelligence to arise. You ask, "What controls the brain?" The answer is that the brain controls itself. Genetic instructions provide the general architecture, some basic functions, and guidelines by which the brain can reprogram itself to adapt to new situations (and handle duplicate situations more efficiently in the future). These beginning features allow what we call the "mind" to build itself, from the ground up.

But then you get into the area of what a mind does. Memories for example. Are these stored within the brain? And if so, how come I forgot thing one day and remember it a month later? Braincells die every second, shouldn't I be forgetting things constantly?

People with photographic memory pose a larger prospect, for they (while having perfect memory is by my understanding an overstatement) have exceptional memory. If you can remember every little thing through most of your life, yet your braincells die at the same rate as everyone else's (aside from heavy alcohol consumption and blows to the head), how do you reconcile that?

I never liked the idea that my brain is what makes me Me. If it were true all it'd take is a few more steps in science to be able to reprogram people to be different people. I'd like to think that memories--and my mind-- lie with my soul, and are reasonably safe from those who would subdue me.

Memories, personality, habits, learned experiences, etc., are not stored in brain cells. They are stored on the neural networks the brain cells form, usually in a redundant fashion. Another way to look at memories: they are not stored, they are re-created. A memory isn't just a visual and/or auditory image. It is a mass of knowledge references that re-create an experienced event. Most complex memories, if they are investigated in detail, are full of small errors, places where your brains reference section filled in a blank spot. Say, if you didn't register a clear image of that white dog, memory might fill in the breed for you.

This effect is most pronounced in the memory of dreams. Dreams are, for the most part, the brain trying to make sense of chemical surges and neural flashes that accompany some of the refiling of data that takes place during sleep. If you wake up and have trouble remembering a dream, think harder. Your brain will fill in the details, and if a clearer memory of the dream should flash through your mind later in the day, it can easily be quite unlike the forced memory you created immediately after awakening.


Again, all that "better memory" implies is that you have more efficient filing software working the vast neural networks in the memory sectors of your brain. There are techniques for training the brain to remember more and to remember clearly. European scribes a "rooms and doors" method t back in the days when parchment was too expensive for general bookkeeping. Christian, Moslem, and east Asian priests and devotees all use meditative techniques to file vast amounts of holy writ. I recall from Guiness that the record for the Koran in is the tens of thousands of verses. In our society, we remember less because we have so many other ways of recording data.



Your best defense against that is the innate complexity of the brain. Programming different personality traits and beliefs on a human mind without destroying it is probably impossible.

Changing personality permanently through physical, chemical, or biological means is a common, everyday affair.

Anyone who has had to tend to a stroke victim for a couple of years has witnessed a human personality being destroyed a few thousand neurons at a time. Eventually, if the disease doesn't strike a vital neural system, you eventually have nothing left but a few reflexes and learned behaviors serving as a ghostly reminder of the person who used to be in that body. My own father lost everything until, at the end, all he had left was the reflex of smiling at the sound of my mother's voice.

The most common neural personality change is one we all go through: adolescence. The childs brain, its supporting systems, and many of its "feelings" and learned behaviors are altered by the chemical changes in the endocrine system caused by physical maturity.

If you're lucky, you can re-configure your positive desires and traits on the fly and add adult traits that complement them. If you aren't lucky, your parents have to endure several years of a hate-filled stranger in their house, tormenting them at every opportunity. When my wife was having trouble with her teen-age daughters, I described this as "hormone poisoning." It helped her understand that it would pass, eventually, and that she could hope to not take it personally and put it behind her.

Of course, if parents do not understand that they have to adapt to their children becoming chemical adults, they end up tormenting their kids for a few years until both sides negotiate new relationships.

Compicated, ain't it?

Thus my earlier post about philosophers, mathematicians, and computer scientists waxing pompous, saying that the brain just can't be this, or just has to be that, because of blah blah blah.



But philosophy never bothers to wait for facts, it just gazes at the bellybutton and disregards the real world.

While philosophy can, like all systems of organized thought, overreach itself, it has its place in the debate. After all, the scientific method is itself a philosophic concept.

Even if, as I suspect, "The Self" is an evolvable self-referential and self-bounded information state, with the "hardware" being human neural circuitry, saying <i>that</i> is a philosophical statement. It remains for philosophy to decide how to organize the software for abstract purposes.

Philosophy was invented for that purpose, a self-referential way of organizing human thinking at the level beyond biological control. Its goal was to replace non-referential systems. The oldest forms of habit, culture, theology, and "common sense" were evolved to handle abstract consciousness after it evolved from instinctive, "animal" awareness. Modern theology, from the time of Aknaton on through Buddhism and later religions, analyzed abstract consciousness with the specific intent of organizing it using the tools of abstract consciousness.

Philosophy, in the Greek traditon, takes on that same task with the option of disregarding the supernatural. Linked with the abstract divinity of Hebrew monothesism, it created modern Western intellectual culture. "Science," which studies the physical world through observation and experiment, is a carefully bounded subset of Western philosophy. It still remains for the other branches of philosophy to study consciousness and thought at the abstract level, beyond whatever science defines at the physical level.

As I said, at a higher programming level, beyond binary and machine language.

Pretty close?

Yep.

Science is not about machines and chemicals and electricity. Science is a epistemological thesis with some very specific axioms, and those axioms do nothing to relate to things outside their purview.

Logic, as Boss out of town said, the mind is a pattern supported by the brain. It does not necessarily have to be self-aware, only that it be able to make judgements from whatever rules it possesses. So, like animals, our computers do possess minds, only that they are not aware.

If there is no evidence for something, you cannot believe that it exists and remain sane. You can however allow for the possibility of its existence as a negative cannot be proven by a non-infinite mind. You also cannot prove something negatively, you can only end up with a hole shaped to that thing but not prove the thing itself.



Forrest, first, i was refering to ri]]3r not you, and 'value judgements' refer to judgements on what should or should not be, what is better and what is worse. The knowledge that both sniper rifles and machine guns are rifles does not allow one to judge whether the sniper rifle or the machine gun is better at being a rifle. As you say, a human brain, an alien brain and an AI could all be 'intelligent' but empirical science cannot say which is 'better' or which is sentient and which is not, which is a person and which is not a person. That's where the value judgements come in.



This is a value judgement; albeit one that isn't substantiated since we haven't come to any fixed positions at all (we've only collapsed untenable positions) what we have been doing is opening up non-referential ideas for referential ones.

That second sentence confused me. I think the structure is a little off? You say that you can't think something that has no proof of being real is real. I get that. But the second sentence sortof states otherwise if you have a different frame of mind? What?

There's no proof of God, yet ninety percent of the world believe there is one. Is the whole planet apeshit nuts?

I'm still holding out on the whole "I'm a brain, hur hur hur," thing. If we're only chemical impulses or synaptic firings or whatever... It makes me depressed thinking about it. That's so bullshit. Life is nothing but a grand version of Speak and Spell? All that we do amounts to nothing, because no matter what we're going to die and that's the end?

I'm not religious. I'd like to claim that I'm agnostic and whenever someone brings Religion up in a conversation I leave the room (unless I wanna argue...) But I have to believe that I am more than this hunk of meat and I'm not just some complicated series of beeps and boops and chemical farts that make me feel like I'm experiencing emotion.

There's so much shit that people do that science can't account for (I don't feel like searching the intertron for examples, so you'll have to forgive me). I realize I'm using science as a general term, but still.

And I know something of strokes. My father has had two and he recovered from both of them. When he was recovering he said "I feel like I've blown a chunk of my brain away and I have to learn how to drive again." He was referring to driving his body.

I'm not arguing your point or trying to change your mind... I'm not actually sure what I'm trying. I think I'm just trying to figure out what I think about myself, hope about myself.

I view my body as a car, with my brain being the steering wheel, brakes, accelerator and shift changer-shaft-thinger-whatchamacallit. With my Dad's testimony, a stroke is something akin to losing the steering wheel and having to drive with a vicegrip wrench on the driveshaft, and learn how to do that while something gets fixed. I'd asked him if this was a good analogy but he's driving to Fresno for some reason at the moment.

Blah. Braaaaaaaaains.